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An attempt is made to distinguish between brain states required to support con-
sciousness and the neuronal underpinnings of conscious versus non-conscious pro-
cessing in an awake, attentive brain, respectively. It is argued that brain states
supporting consciousness are characterised by high dimensional dynamics exhibit-
ing a high degree of complexity, implying that conscious states are graded. Differ-
ent mechanisms determine whether signals are processed at the conscious or sub-
conscious level. Thus, there is no unique neuronal correlate of consciousness.
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1 Introduction
My sincere thanks go to Valdas Noreika for hav-
ing  identified  with  succinct  clarity  the  weak-
nesses  in  our  current  attempt  to  identify  the
neuronal  correlates  of  consciousness  (NCC).  I
would  have  sincerely  appreciated  these  com-
ments before finalising my manuscript, as they
would  have  forced  me  to  distinguish  more
clearly between the neuronal underpinnings of
the conscious state and the neuronal correlates
of conscious versus unconscious processing. 
Noreika is absolutely right in pointing out
that the search for the mechanisms permitting
access  to  conscious  processing  falls  short  of
identifying the NCC proper and, likewise, that
the determination of variables required for the
maintenance of a conscious state is insufficient
if pursued without considering the contents of
conscious  processing.  The  mere  fact  that  one
can distinguish  between  the  “conscious  state”
and the conditions required for “conscious pro-
cessing”, yet also consider both as targets in the
search for the NCC, suggests that the explanan-
dum is  ill-defined.  Presently,  both studies  de-
voted to the distinction between conscious and
unconscious processing and those investigating
the  brain  states  required  for  conscious  pro-
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cessing are considered as investigations of  the
NCC,  although  they  clearly  target  different
neuronal  mechanisms.  Thus,  studies  on  con-
sciousness  are  fraught  with  the  problem of  a
lack of a clear definition of “the” consciousness
for which we wish to find a neuronal correlate.
Another problem is that we are still  far from
fully  understanding  the  neuronal  mechanisms
underlying  higher  cognitive  functions.  Behavi-
oural studies suggest, for example, that percep-
tion  involves  probabilistic  Bayesian-matching
operations  in  which  sensory  evidence  is  com-
pared with stored knowledge about the probab-
ility of occurrence and the features of the re-
spective perceptual objects.  However,  it  is  en-
tirely unknown where and how the huge amount
of priors are stored, how the specific priors can
be retrieved on the fly within the few hundreds
of  milliseconds  sufficient  for  recognition,  and
how  the  matching  operations  are  realized  in
neuronal networks. Thus, at the present stage it
is even impossible to precisely define the signa-
tures  of  neuronal  activity  that  could  be  con-
sidered the result of a perceptual process or as
the neuronal representation of a percept. 
In the light of these uncertainties, the dis-
tinctions  between  conscious  and  unconscious
processing  or  between  states  compatible  with
conscious and unconscious processing,  respect-
ively, appear to be exploited primarily in order
to  learn  more  about  mechanisms  underlying
pattern recognition, decision making, and inten-
tionality, rather than serving the search for the
neuronal  underpinnings  of  the  ill-defined phe-
nomenon that we address as “consciousness”. In
contrast to NCC research, these more humble
approaches have been quite successful, probably
because  the  explananda  are  well-defined  and
can be operationalised. 
2 The conscious state
The analysis  of  the  neuronal  prerequisites  re-
quired for the maintenance of consciousness has
a long history and has only recently been con-
sidered  part  of  consciousness  research.  The
reason for this is that the criteria used for dis-
tinctions between conscious and non-conscious
states or altered states of consciousness can be
tested in both humans and animals. Examples
of these criteria are reactivity to noxious stim-
uli,  the ability to move intentionally,  and the
ability to accomplish a number of well-defined
cognitive tasks,  involving  attention,  short  and
long  term  memory,  recognition,  and  decision
making. Thus, the plethora of studies performed
both on animals and humans on the neuronal
mechanisms  underlying  arousal,  attention,
wakefulness,  sleep,  anaesthesia,  and  coma  all
contribute to our understanding of the neuronal
prerequisites of states permitting conscious pro-
cessing. Accordingly, it is well-established that
brain  functions  characteristic  of  the  conscious
state require that neuronal networks operate in
a critical dynamical range. This range is regu-
lated by half a dozen globally-acting modulat-
ory systems that originate in deep and evolu-
tionary ancient brain structures. The adjustable
neuronal parameters are essentially the balance
between  excitatory  and  inhibitory  effects  and
the time- and length constants of dendritic in-
tegration.  These  adjustments  lead  to  marked
modifications of the system’s dynamics. These
modulations are reflected by changes in the pre-
vailing frequencies of oscillatory activity, the de-
gree and spatial granularity of synchronisation
(also addressed as correlation length), and the
propagation of signals across the network. 
Classical  brain  theories  have  not  attrib-
uted much attention to the significance of these
dynamic  variables  for  processing  and  assume
that loss  of  consciousness  in sleep and anaes-
thesia is essentially due to reduced excitability
and signal transmission. However,  in more re-
cent  theories,  brain  dynamics  are  thought  to
play  a  crucial  role  in  information  processing.
This novel framework provides much more spe-
cific explanation of the breakdown of conscious-
ness in sleep, anaesthesia, and coma. These the-
ories posit that oscillations and the concomitant
variables,  such as synchronisation,  phase lock-
ing, phase relations, and cross frequency coup-
ling, are relevant for signal selection by atten-
tion, binding operations, and the representation
of  nested  semantic  relations  (for  review  see
Singer 1999;  Buzsáki et al. 2013). In addition,
these complex dynamics have been proposed as
a substrate for  the generation of  the high-di-
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mensional coding space required for the storage
and  superposition  of  priors,  the  matching  of
stored information with sensory evidence,  and
the segregation of patterns for classification (for
review see Singer 2013). The basis of these op-
erations  is  the  transformation  of  low-dimen-
sional input patterns into high-dimensional dy-
namic states, in order to perform the necessary
computations in this space and to then retrans-
form  the  results  into  low-dimensional  output
signals. The advantages of performing computa-
tions  in  high-dimensional  dynamic  space  are
currently explored in the conceptual framework
of “reservoir computing” or “liquid state or echo
state  machines”  (Bertschinger &  Natschläger
2004; Buonomano & Maass 2009; Jaeger 2001).
Recent analysis of the properties of recur-
rent networks, such as those realized in neur-
onal systems and in particular the cerebral cor-
tex,  indicate  that  such  high-dimensional  dy-
namic states can indeed be generated in delay-
coupled  networks  (Lazar et  al. 2009;  Buono-
mano & Maass 2009; Soriano et al. 2013; for re-
view see Singer 2013). In the present context it
is  important  to  recall  that  the  dynamics  re-
quired for such computations can emerge only
when the networks are in the appropriate state.
The  optimal  state  has  been  identified  as  the
edge of chaos, slightly below self-organised crit-
icality, the so-called SOC state, because in this
state  the  dimensionality  or  the  complexity  of
the system are very high. Computationally this
range is optimal because it offers a maximum of
possible bifurcation points and storage capacity.
(Plenz & Thiagarajan 2007). In this conceptual
framework, computational results should consist
of  substates  with  reduced  dimensionality.  Ex-
perimental evidence indicates that the high-di-
mensional resting states are actually reduced by
sensory input,  imagery,  recall  of  memories,  or
focused attention. These processes are all asso-
ciated with enhanced correlation between neur-
onal responses due to the induction of synchron-
ized  high-frequency  oscillations—where  enhan-
cing correlations reduces dimensionality (for re-
view  see  Singer 2013).  The  notion  that  SOC
states  are  optimal  prerequisites  for  processing
also  fits  with  the  robust  evidence  that  states
compatible with consciousness are characterized
by “desynchronized” brain activity,  i.e.,  states
characterized by uncorrelated activity, such as
are typical for wakefulness and arousal. If, and
evidence suggests this to be the case (for review
see  Singer 1999,  2013), establishment of lower-
dimensional  synchronous  substates,  e.g.,  the
formation of transiently-synchronized assemblies
of neurons, is an integral part of the computa-
tions,  then  dynamic  states  characterized  by
global, large scale synchrony would be inappro-
priate as background for computations underly-
ing higher cognitive functions.
As outlined in the target paper and above,
higher  cognitive  functions  require  fine-grained
binding  operations  among  semantically-related
contents  that  need to  be  encoded in  ad hoc-
formed neuronal assemblies. Such concatenation
of  multiple  assemblies  by  partial  correlations
and  perhaps  also  cross-frequency  coupling
would  be  impossible  in  networks  that  are
already highly synchronized to begin with and
hence exhibit low complexity and dimensional-
ity. The well-established notion that deep sleep,
anaesthesia, and most forms of coma are associ-
ated with brain states that exhibit slow oscilla-
tions  synchronized  over  considerable  distances
agrees  with  this  interpretation.  In  agreement
with the prediction that low-dimensional brain
states are incompatible with sophisticated pro-
cessing are also the recent stimulation experi-
ments  cited  by Noreika.  It  is  to  be  expected
that stimulation of a dynamic system that is in
a  low-dimensional  state  and at  an  overall  re-
duced level of excitability will elicit only a spa-
tially-restricted responses of low complexity—in
particular if  the stimulus is itself  very low-di-
mensional, as is the case for a TMS pulse. 
Considering more recent theories on brain
functions, it appears as if the prerequisite or the
NCC of  a  conscious  state  is  a  dynamic  state
that  assures  a  high degree  of  complexity  and
high-dimensionality of resting-state dynamics. It
is only in this state that the higher cognitive
functions can be realized that one expects from
a conscious brain.
It should be noted, however, that this op-
erational  definition  of  consciousness  makes  no
inferences about the subjective contents of con-
sciousness or the awareness of particular qualia
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of experience. According to this definition, con-
sciousness  is  simply a brain state that  allows
animals and humans to accomplish higher cog-
nitive functions that include not only perception
but also decision making, planning of actions,
generation of procedural and episodic memories,
and last but not least intentionality and reason-
ing.  Thus,  one  would  expect  consciousness,
defined  in  this  way,  to  be  a  graded  phe-
nomenon. If the state of the brain changes to-
wards  reduced  complexity  and  dimensionality,
there should be a graded deterioration of func-
tions. Those requiring integration of widely-dis-
tributed  assemblies  should  become  impeded
first,  while  simple reactions to salient  sensory
stimuli  would  persist  for  much  longer.  This
seems  to  be  in  perfect  agreement  with  the
gradual  deterioration of  cognitive functions as
the brain state shifts from high levels of alert-
ness to drowsiness and sleep. 
3 Conscious versus subconscious 
processing
As Noreika points out, “consciousness” defined
by the status of phenomenal content is some-
thing very different from a conscious state,  as
this  connotation of  consciousness  can only be
investigated in human subjects. The reason for
this  is  that the distinguishing criterion is  the
degree  of  subjective  awareness  of  a  cognitive
content, and this variable can only be assessed
through verbal report. It is simply not possible
to know whether a monkey trained to press a
lever to signal that it has recognized a particu-
lar  pattern has the subjective experience that
we equate with conscious perception. The mon-
key brain has the same mechanisms as humans
for the allocation of attention, the selection of
objects for perception, and the routing of exper-
iences to the different storage modes (working
memory,  procedural  and  episodic  memory).
Thus it is very likely that monkeys are aware of
their  perceptions in a similar  way to us,  and
that the distinction between conscious and non-
conscious processing holds for  them as  well—
but we have no way of  knowing. Conditioned
lever presses in response to stimuli do not re-
quire conscious perception of the stimuli, just as
stopping at a red light while being engaged in a
conversation does not require conscious recollec-
tion of having perceived the light. It is for this
reason  that  the  criterion  for  conscious  pro-
cessing  is  the  reportability  of  the  perceived
stimulus, and hence this aspect of consciousness
can only be studied in humans. 
Attempts  to  identify  the  differences
between the neuronal processes that accompany
non-conscious and conscious processing, respect-
ively,  are  of  course  interesting  in  their  own
right. The expectation is that they will provide
answers to the question of why certain processes
are reportable and have access to working and
episodic memory while others are excluded, or
the question of why certain forms of reasoning
and decision-making require conscious delibera-
tions while others do not. However, as pointed
out so stringently by Noreika,  these  attempts
fall short of identifying the NCC proper, and at
best cover some aspects of conscious processing
while  being fraught with problems.  The most
difficult problems are related to the distinction
between the processes that are essential for sub-
jective  awareness  and  reportability  and  those
that  are  the  consequence  of  having  become
aware of something or that simply provide fa-
vourable conditions for becoming aware, such as
the  allocation  of  attention  or  the  saliency  of
stimuli. So far the only neuronal signatures dis-
tinguishing between reportable and non-report-
able processes have been found to be transitory,
lasting  at  most  a  few  hundred  milliseconds.
Noreika  argues  rightly  that  this  disqualifies
these  events  as  NCCs  because  the  stream of
consciousness is  continuous and the awareness
of contents can persist for quite some time.
4 Conclusion and outlook
We need to be more cautious when using the
term NCC and to define precisely, each time we
perform a search for underlying neuronal mech-
anisms,  which  of  the  many  aspects  of  “con-
sciousness”  we  actually  intend  to  investigate.
We need to differentiate between processes as-
suring access to conscious processing, which are
expected to be transient, and processes neces-
sary for sustaining the stream of consciousness
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that has longer time-constants. And finally, we
need to distinguish processes assuring sustained
awareness of contents that are most likely re-
lated to the transfer of material to short- and
long-term memories. If we proceed in this way,
subdividing  “consciousness”  into  subfunctions
including reportability and defining these as ex-
plananda,  some  of  the  present  problems  may
dissolve.  However,  the consequence is  that we
shall have to give up the search for “the” over-
arching NCC.
If we pursue this agenda, it is to be expec-
ted that correlates will be found for all aspects
of  consciousness  except  those  associated  with
the “hard” problem, which appears to be a spe-
cific human problem. As I argued in the target
paper, searching for the neuronal correlates of
qualia in individual brains is unlikely to be suc-
cessful  because  the  immaterial  and  therefore
somewhat mysterious connotations of qualia are
likely to have the status of social realities. What
we can achieve, however, is an identification of
brain  processes  that  underlie  those  cognitive
functions required for generating social realities.
These would be the ability to engage in social
interaction, to develop a theory of mind, to find
symbolic descriptions of internal states, and to
reach  consensus  on  the  “reality”  of  these
through communication with others.
To  conclude  this  brief  reply  to  the  ex-
tremely inspiring commentary on my target pa-
per, I want to express my sincere gratitude to
Noreika for having pointed out the critical is-
sues  in  our  research  on  the  NCC.  The  reply
forced  me to  engage  with  this  research  again
and  helped  me  substantially  in  clarifying  my
own position in the debate. 
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